An Analysis of Fregean Sense and Reference of Proper Names in a Kripkean World.

When one considers the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ as compared to the sentence ‘Hesperus is Hesperus,’ one will note that though both names refer to the same object, Venus, there is a distinction in meaning, cognitive significance. The distinction is that ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ tells us nothing about the world beyond the fact that something is itself, and this type of knowledge can be known a priori no matter what the object may be. However, the same cannot be said about ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous,’ but intuitively that there is a distinction in the terms is obvious; explaining why there is a distinction is not so easy. Gottlob Frege’s answer to the question was to introduce the notion of a sense, yet Saul A. Kripke would later challenge this notion that proper names have sense. Despite some very convincing arguments by Kripke, one cannot help but think that Kripke’s analysis has fallen short in one major way: it is not able to give an account of cognitive significance in co-referring proper names. This paper will explore the Fregean account of proper names and the need that he saw for sense. It will then continue, considering Kripke’s arguments against proper names possessing sense, and the consequences that such a view has in the analysis of proper names.

Report on Self-Reliance by Ralph Waldo Emerson

There are so many ideas that run through Emerson’s essay Self-Reliance. The overwhelming obvious main theme of his essay, however, is how to be Self-Reliant and the importance of it, which shall be the focus of this report. What Emerson means by self-reliance is learning how to be ourselves, or how to become what we are (where the implication is that something hinders us from being such). In my own reading of Self-Reliance, I believe there to be two aspects to the self-reliant life: an active and passive part. There is a sense in which Emerson uses the term Self-Reliance ironically— that is, in becoming self-reliant, we in fact our giving ourselves over to something greater, something that works through us. What this is Emerson calls the Divine: with this in mind, one would be justified in seeing Self-Reliance as an essay about living out one’s skepticism (as Emerson meant the term), where the unknown should not hold us back from doing and acting from ourselves, though we might not know the outcome.

Report on The Quest for Certainty by John Dewey

The title of John Dewey’s book The Quest for Certainty describes the way that humans have throughout the ages of philosophy (of which science is included) sought after absolute notions by which one could make one’s life more certain. It is a book that explores the relation between epistemology and action. Dewey argues that a lot of the problems within the Theory of knowledge are created by the assumptions about the capacity of knowledge itself, that people try to make use of it or establish theories by it independent of the actual consequence that such a position has. What Dewey wanted to demonstrate is that pure reason is not a sufficient means of gaining existential control of anything, but that if one wants to know what a idea means, one must test the idea and see what follows from it. In fact, Dewey subtitle to the The Quest for Certainty is A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action—that is, for Dewey, knowledge in action.

Report on The Fixation of Belief by Charles Sanders Peirce

Charles S. Peirce’s The Fixation of Belief is an essay on reasoning and its relation to the formulation of beliefs. The importance of this essay is its dealing with human limitation in reasoning about logical matters. In other words, the notion of being able to use reason as a means of gaining understanding must be guided so as to provide the best possibility of acquiring true knowledge.

Peirce describes logic as a natural function of the mind of the human animal, a system of guiding principles that help determine true facts about existence from other true facts. The principles of logic or reason become a habit of mind, which in turn is used to guide the animal through life. Peirce states, “That which determines us […] to draw one inference rather than another is some habit of the mind […]. The habit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from true premises or not” (227).

Newton’s Laws as Allegory

Newton’s Laws as Allegory
by Vern Sheridan Poythress

Fresh insight into scientific laws can be gained by viewing them as “allegories” within the universe as God’s choral poem. Newton’s laws serve as a principal example.

In an earlier article (Poythress 1983) I argued that the universe can be viewed as God’s choral poem. Within that poem are many analogies and multi-dimensional relationships. In particular, the world “as poem” is (1) personally structured, (2) linguistically structured, (3) shot-through with metaphor and analogy, (4) utterly dependent on God, (5) undergoing development, (6) surprising in showing a triumph over chaos.

Since science can be viewed as a special system of allegories (”models”) within the poem, the above features should at least at times characterize scientific laws. Let us see how Newton’s laws in particular look from this type of perspective. As summarized by the Encyclopedia Britannica (1974: vol. 13, p. 19) Newton’s three laws of motion are

1. that a body remains in its state of rest unless it is compelled to change that state by a force impressed on it;
2. that the change of motion (the change of velocity times the mass of the body) is proportional to the force impressed;
3. that to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  Continue reading…

Transitivity in both Ontology and Language

Abstract: the purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship that exist between empiricism and language. That is, empirical observation does not presuppose knowledge about existence, rather it holds that knowledge is that which is communicated to us through the sense. If language is to communicate ideas about existence from one mind to another, then we should see this underlying transitive notion to language. The paper thus attempts to show how intransitive forms of linguistic constructions are in fact transitive. The implications of this is that transitivity is a fundamental or underlying notion of language. The reason is then associated with the very constitution of existence. In other words, the linguistic trait of transitivity is such becuase all human experience is such, and as a result, seeing that language’s purpose is for the communication of existential phenomena, it is obligated to take on this transitive form. This then attacks notions of a priori knowledge and innate ideal, concepts and notions. As a note, this is an older paper, and as a result of such, it is far more analytical, rather than my more present pragmatic inclinations. This paper is written from the cognitive linguistic persuasion, and thus, has both linguistic and philosophic implications.

Transitivity is defined by traditional grammars as a verb that takes one or more objects. Though this is the case that a transitive verb does in fact take one or more objects, it is more so the concept of transitivity that makes it what it is:

The Finitude of Man and Ethical Theory

The gatekeeper of philosophy is epistemology; the limitations of our knowledge directly determines the intelligibility of all about which we talk or think. Ethical theory also must pass by the gatekeeper, and though this is nothing more than a truism, it is often neglected within ethical theory. Human knowledge is finite, limited, and thus fallible. The nature of a correspondence of one’s knowledge to ontology is one that affords no certainty. Certainty verses probability is a fundamental principle in all philosophical inquiry. Where no certainty is granted, then one’s philosophy may only be probable at best. Ethics is not free from, what can only be called, a tragic epistemological problem; namely, that certainty about one’s moral system is always tainted with doubt. Deontological and utilitarian ethical systems, I believe, do not respect this fundamental limitation of human knowledge. In fact, not only does it deny this limitation of human knowledge, but it also hinders one from being able to assess and function properly in this reality. Virtue ethics, and even moral perfectionism, provide an ethical system that attempts to work within this paradigm of human finitude. With advancements in epistemology seen particularly in pragmatic writings, Virtue Ethics is far more able to work within such limitations of human knowledge. In fact, the notion of reaching or attaining some universal standard from which our ethical decisions can be made directly opposes the limitations of human knowledge. Thus, this paper will explore pragmatic thought on epistemology, the limits that such a system sets, and how specifically Virtue Ethics satisfies these criteria.

American Pragmatism

This is a very brief introduction to American Pragmatism: it covers two very important philosophers of our time-Putnam and Rorty-, and what each one believes concerning the evolution of such a philosophical paradigm.

Wildest Offshoots

There can be no appeasement between those who presuppose in all their thought the sovereign God and those who presuppose in all their thought the would-be sovereign man.  There can be no other point of contact between them than that of head-on collision.  The root of both irrationalism and rationalism is the idea of the ultimacy of man.  If this root is not taken out, it will do little good to trim off some of the wildest offshoots of irrationalism with the help of rationalism, or to trim off some of the wildest offshoots of rationalism with the help of irrationalism.

Cornelius Van Til, The Intellectuall Challenge of the Gospel (1953), p. 19